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Then and Now-Changes in Public International
Law Over the Life of the Journal
A. Mark Weisburd'
I. Introduction
On the fifth page of the first volume of the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation,
Governor James E. Holshouser, Jr., wrote:
The North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation was founded to provide information
[about developments in international law affecting international
business transactions] that is practical and easily digested. It
will identify special areas of international law which will affect
particular institutions and businesses.
Since its founding, the Journal has remained faithful to this
statement of its mission. Public international law, however,
embraces many topics that at first glance may have little to do with
the subjects Governor Holshouser identified. The question may
fairly be raised, then, why should an article on the changes in
public international law even appear in this publication?'
The answer to this question is that it has become more and
more difficult in the last twenty-five years to identify areas of
public international law which do not, in some manner, "affect
particular institutions and businesses." This is most clearly true as
to those developments in public international law which directly
impact day to day international practice, for example, with respect
Professor of Law, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; A.B.,
Princeton University, 1970; J.D., University of Michigan, 1976.
2 James E. Holshouser, Jr., Introduction, 1 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. v, v-vi
(1976).
3 One reason, of course, is that I teach public international law and can write about
it, while I know very little about international commercial law and certainly cannot write
about that. Since my ignorance is my problem and not the reader's, however, I don't
expect anyone else to agree that my limitations amount to an affirmative justification for
an article addressing subjects arguably with little or no relation to the general thrust of
this publication.
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to international trade. But even such matters of high politics as
changes in the international response to the use of force
significantly affect the ease, or difficulty, of all manner of
international interchanges. While Americans might think
questions of the international law of human rights primarily affect
persons in countries with neither a bill of rights nor a strong
judiciary, change in this area also has a direct bearing on everyday
business practice in North Carolina-indeed, a recent article in the
Journal points out that American businesses might find
themselves affected by international human rights law rather more
directly than they find comfortable.4
This article, therefore, will address developments in three
areas. Part II discusses briefly fundamental changes in the law of
international trade which have taken place since 1975.' Part III
addresses developments in international regulation of the use of
force. Finally, Part IV discusses the evolution of the international
law of human rights.7 These topics are rather different from those
addressed in Issue One of Volume One, but perhaps the most
fundamental change in public international law in the past quarter
century is the extent to which discussion of such subjects has
come to satisfy Governor Holshouser's description of the
Journal's purpose.
H. From GATT to WTO
Anyone involved in the law of international trade, or who read
accounts of the riots in Seattle in the fall of 1999,8 can hardly be
unaware of the existence of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), of course existed in 1975, but drew rather less attention
than has the WTO. Why the WTO is rightly seen as different from
GATT in several significant aspects, and why it is not, is one of
the significant changes in public international law since 1975.
4 Lucien J. Dhooge, A Close Shave in Burma: Unocal Corporation and Private
Enterprise Liability for International Human Rights Violations, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 1 (1998).
1 See infra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 19-45 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 46-73 and accompanying text.
8 See Michael Elliott, The New Radicals, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1999, at 36-39; see
also Kenneth Klee et al., The Siege of Seattle, id at 30-35.
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The WTO was formally established by an international
agreement concluded in 1994.9  Although the agreements
accompanying its formation broadened the categories of trade
subject to regulation by multilateral agreement as compared to the
pre-1994 regime,' the approach to substantive regulation taken in
these agreements is simply an extension of the approach taken by
GATT regarding trade in goods. Nor does the rmechanism for
enforcing states' obligations differ. In both cases, the ultimate
sanction for one state's violation of the rights of another under the
relevant agreement is the imposition of retaliatory measures by the
victim state after authorization by the international body." The
crucial difference between GATT and the WTO goes to the
manner in which an authorization for retaliation is granted.
Under GATT, disputes between states regarding acts alleged to
violate the agreement could be referred to ad hoc panels for
consideration; however, the decisions of those panels were not
binding.'2 Rather, the decisions became binding upon the parties
to the dispute only after adoption by the General Council of
GATT, and adoption required unanimity, including the agreement
of the states who were parties to the dispute in question. 3 That is,
if a state clearly violated GATI with respect to a second state, and
the second state followed to the letter all the procedures
established to deal with such situations, and the dispute resolution
panel agreed completely with the position of the second state, the
wrongdoing state could nonetheless deny binding effect to the
panel's determination simply by refusing to agree to the General
9 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
10 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, Vol. 28, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994); Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
11 See Andreas F. Lowenfield, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in
the New GATT, 88 A.J.I.L. 477, 481 (1984); see also General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
12 See Lowenfield, supra note 11, at 479.
13 See id.
20001 535
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Council's adoption of that determination. 4
Unanimity is still relevant to the adoption of the
recommendations of dispute resolution under the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 5
(Dispute Settlement Understanding) adopted in conjunction with
the agreement establishing the WTO, but with a crucial difference.
Under the new agreement, a panel report is adopted by the WTO
as binding unless the states that are members of the organization
unanimously reject the report.'6 We have moved from allowing a
wrongdoing party to block unilaterally an internationally created
remedy to a regime in which the victim of the wrongdoing can
unilaterally insist on a binding remedy.
What difference will this make? Certainly, it will decrease the
room for negotiation for states violating their obligations under the
trade agreements overseen by the WTO. Under the old system,
states determined by panels to have violated their obligations
under GATT were able to compel the victim states to settle the
dispute for something less than the result to which they were
entitled under the agreements, despite panel determinations that
the victims' rights had in fact been violated. 7 Under the new
system, the advantage clearly shifts to the victim, since the
wrongdoer cannot prevent the victim's ultimately being authorized
to retaliate. One may assume that, under the new system,
violations of trade agreements will be less common, since the risks
from such violations have been increased.
At one level, this statement may seem mistaken. After all,
under the former system as under the current system, the only real
sanction for treaty violation was retaliation by the victim state.
Furthermore, if the former system could not prevent violations,
neither could it prevent retaliation for violations. Why then would
the new system make violations more risky?
Understanding this point requires consideration of the reasons
why states enter into trade agreements in the first place. At
14 See id. at 479-80.
11 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
16 See id., at art. 16.
1 See Lowenfield, supra note 11, at 480, n.6.
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bottom, each state adhering to such an agreement assumes that it
would gain more from other states' opening their markets to its
products than it would lose from opening its own to theirs. That
is, the advantage to each party derives from compliance by other
parties, but that compliance, in turn, is premised on the
expectation of reciprocal compliance. Doubts as to whether such
reciprocal compliance will take place will make states reluctant to
honor their own obligations, thereby jeopardizing the whole
system. Any violation of the rules necessarily raises fears that this
network of reciprocal exchanges is about to unravel. A state that
violates the rules anyway presumably assumes that the benefit it
realizes from its violation outweighs the increased risk to the
system its violation poses. A state contemplating retaliation,
however, is also violating the rules if it acts outside the relevant
treaty framework, and thus also jeopardizes the system. Further,
its gain from retaliation presumably depends at least as much on
the ending of the violation that provoked the retaliation as on
whatever gains it realizes from its retaliatory violation. Its motive
for retaliation would, in the first instance, be the protection of the
system. In other words, to retaliate in order to protect the system
simultaneously endangers the system, if the retaliation is
unsanctioned. This situation therefore reduced the likelihood of
retaliation under the old system, and thus reduced the risk of
violations.
Under the new system, however, sanctioned retaliations will be
much more common. Retaliation will now be a part of the system,
not a threat to it. Hence, the likelihood of such retaliation
increases, and the risk in violating the rules therefore also
increases.
From a lawyer's point of view, it is crucial to focus on the
mechanism used to bring about this change. Governments agreed
to be subjected to third-party evaluations of their compliance with
a general set of rules, even without their consent in particular
cases. This system replaced one in which disputes were decided,
as a practical matter, on a case by case basis and in the context of
the overall relationships between the parties. That is, states agreed
to replace a system in which states had some scope for avoiding
purportedly governing general rules with one that not only reduces
the ability to avoid those rules, but reaches that result by requiring
submission to what amounts to judicial determinations of
compliance.
20001 537
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States have thus decided, in establishing the WTO's dispute
resolution system, that the concrete gains they hope to experience
from a free trade regime can be realized only if they accept the
limitations on sovereignty inherent in the submission to judicial
determinations of legality. Law, in this case, is not simply a
limitation on states' freedom; it is the means whereby states enable
themselves to reap benefits not otherwise available.
In this particular area of international intercourse, then, one
development over the past twenty-five years is states' realization
that submission to law can facilitate, rather than obstruct,
achievement of state objectives. Further, this development has
taken place regarding a subject whose link to international
business could hardly be more obvious.
HI. The Use of Force
The publication of Volume One of the Journal coincided with
an exceptionally violent period in international relations. In
December 1975, just prior to the date the Journal first appeared,
Indonesia invaded and began its conquest of East Timor.'9 In July
1977, Somalia's army invaded Ethiopia in support of ethnic
Somali separatists. 0 In October 1978, Uganda invaded Tanzania;
Ugandan troops withdrew in November, but Tanzania invaded
Uganda in January 1979.21 Vietnam invaded Cambodia (then
called Kampuchea) in December 1978.22 China responded to this
invasion by attacking Vietnam in February 1979.23 The Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan in December of that year. 4 September
1980 saw Iraq invade Iran.
The United Nations was established primarily to prevent inter-
18 For a discussion of different disputes that have come before the WTO, see Sue
Ann Mota, The World Trade Organization: An Analysis of Disputes, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REo. 75 (1999).
'9 See A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD
WAR H 248 (1997).
20 See id. at 38.
21 See id at 40-41.
22 See id. at 42.
23 See id. at 282.
24 See id. at 45.
25 See id. at 47.
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state uses of force in circumstances forbidden by the U.N.
Charter,26 and each of the incidents just listed at least arguably
involved Charter violations. 27 At this period, however, the U.N.
was essentially ineffective in preventing such uses of force. Its
response to the invasion of East Timor was limited to verbal
criticisms of Indonesia by both the General Assembly and the
Security Council.2' The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan
evoked a similar response, albeit one limited to the General
Assembly.29 No U.N. organ even addressed either the fighting
between Somalia and Ethiopia or that between Uganda and
Tanzania, and none took action regarding the Chinese attack on
Vietnam.30 Stronger action was taken in the case of Vietnam's
invasion of Cambodia, in that the General Assembly refused to
seat representatives of the government Vietnam established in
Cambodia.3 Likewise, the Security Council actively addressed the
Iran-Iraq war, though it did not invoke its mandatory authority in
an effort to compel-rather than request-an end to the fighting
until July 1987, nearly seven years after the war began.32 Of
course, individual states reacted to each of these events in varying
ways, in many cases actively seeking to coerce the state perceived
as the wrongdoer into abandoning its behavior.33  But the
international community had sought to establish machinery to
compel obedience to the standards of the Charter, and at the time
of the Journal's birth, that machinery clearly was failing to
26 See Louis HENKIN ET. AL., RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE 38-39 (2d ed. 1991).
27 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (obliging states to "refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state."). The attacks by Indonesia on East Timor, Somalia on
Ethiopia, and Iraq on Iran were attempts to conquer territory, while the invasions of
Uganda, Cambodia, and Afghanistan were all efforts to replace the incumbent
governments in the target states with groups more agreeable to the invaders. See
WEISBURD, supra note 19, at 37-38, 40-45, 47, 248. China's objective in attacking
Vietnam was likewise to pressure the Vietnamese government into making particular
political decisions. See id. at 280-83.
28 See WEISBuRD, supra note 19, at 249.
29 See id at 46.
30 See id at 38, 42, 283.
31 See id. at 43.
32 See id. at 49-50.
33 See id. at 38-39, 43-46, 282-83.
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function as intended.
The situation has changed considerably over the last twenty-
five years, beginning in the late 1980s. On July 20, 1987 the
Security Council adopted a mandatory resolution, based on its
authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, demanding that
the combatants in the Iran-Iraq war agree to a cease-fire; after
some delay, they did so.' The most obvious demonstration of a
new international attitude toward such situations took place in
1990. In that year, the Security Council responded to Iraq's
attempt to subjugate Kuwait by authorizing members of the United
Nations to take whatever actions were necessary, including the use
of force, to protect Kuwait's sovereignty.35
Since the end of the Gulf War, the Security Council has
continued its efforts to address threats to international peace;
producing mixed results. United Nations efforts to assist in ending
civil wars with international implications have seen both striking
successes, as in the assistance provided to Mozambique and El
Salvador to end their civil wars36-and equally striking failures, as
in the continuing disappointment in Angola, despite repeated
agreements between the combatants.37 It is also noteworthy that in
some cases, efforts by the United Nations have seemed not just
ineffective, but ineffectual, as shown by the continuing difficulties
encountered in attempting merely to organize elections to end the
civil war in the Western Sahara." Further, the United Nations has
played little role in addressing certain international situations in
which the risks to peace are obvious. For example, it has not
sought actively to address the dangers posed by the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan. The U.N.'s approach to
the continuing warfare in central Africa has been very cautious,
stressing the prime responsibility of African leaders to end the
fighting."
34 See id. at 48-50.
35 See id. at 55-58.
36 See DAVID MALONE, DECISION-MAKING IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: THE
CASE OF HAITI, 1990-1997 20, 26 (1998).
31 See Suzanne Daley, Hunger Ravages Angolans in Renewed Civil War, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 1999, at Al.
38 See Terence Neilan, World Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1999, at A16.
39 See Barbara Crossette, U.N. Urges End to Congo Cease-Fire Impasse, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2000, at A8.
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What then can one say at this point about the state of the
international machinery established to deal with international
breaches of the peace? One striking fact seems frequently to be
taken for granted: the Security Council retained its authority
during the period of about forty-five years in which its use of that
authority was effectively hamstrung by the Cold War. At one
level, this may not seem surprising. After all, the United Nations
Charter is quite explicit as to the scope of the Council's power;
any claim that the Council has somehow lost the capacity
conferred upon it by the Charter would have to overcome the
effect of the language of that instrument. Nonetheless, history is
replete with examples of institutions whose formal power has
atrophied as that power has not been used, such that any attempt
by the institution to reclaim the authority formally permitted to it
would be seen as an abuse. How, for example, would Americans
react if the members of the Electoral College took it upon
themselves to deliberate over the choice of the President and Vice-
President, as permitted by the Constitution?
40
Yet the Council's authority has not withered despite its non-
use. For example, no state challenged the legal capacity of the
Council to authorize a forceful response to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, even though the Council had taken no comparable action
since the Korean War. To be sure, with China, the Soviet Union
(as it then existed), and the United States all having considerable
incentive to insist upon the continuing validity of the Council's
claim to authority, it would have taken a bold government indeed
to insist that such a claim had been destroyed by atrophy. Yet
quite apart from whatever effect was created by the influence of
the permanent members of the Council, it may be that the states of
the world have come to take for granted that there is much to be
gained for all states in the existence, somewhere in the
international system, of a body capable of addressing the most
serious outbreaks of violence without regard to the consent of the
combatants. In any case, one aspect of the future of the United
Nations with respect to violence prevention is precisely that it
retains the capacity to act through the Security Council even in the
face of opposition by states that might be affected by its action.
Capacity to act is one thing; the ability to act effectively,
40 See U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1, cl. 2, 3.
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however, is another. If the legal capacity of the United Nations
was not affected by the two-generation hiatus in the effective
functioning of the Security Council, the same cannot be said
concerning its operational capability. The character of this
operational capability is the second aspect of the history of the
United Nations that will affect its future workings.
One feature of this issue is a reflection of what might be called
a deformation of the operations of the United Nations during the
Cold War. Although the Charter purports to forbid uses of force
in a variety of circumstances, the paralysis of the Security
Council-the only organ of the United Nations empowered to take
action without regard to the consent of the parties to a dispute-
eliminated even the formal capacity of the United Nations to act
except when such consent had been obtained. This requirement of
consent from all sides as a prerequisite to action established within
the bureaucracy of the United Nations habits of mind more
consistent with a focus on mediation and persuading parties to
refrain from violence than with an orientation toward identifying
particular behavior as a breach of the Charter and therefore
requiring a commensurate response."
This attitudinal problem, however, was not the only difficulty
arising from the long period during which the United Nations
could assist states which had determined to make peace, but could
not otherwise compel states to stop fighting. At the more prosaic
level, the organization had developed little experience in the
mechanics of employing the power of an international
organization to compel a halt to illegal uses of force. This has led
to a number of difficulties as the United Nations has sought to take
on a more active role in the world.
Some of these difficulties are managerial. In other words,
United Nations efforts have encountered difficulties because of the
Security Council's unwillingness to consider carefully the nuts and
bolts requirements of the tasks it sets out to achieve. For example,
the Security Council has prescribed missions without reference to
the resources available to carry them out and without careful
attention to factors essential to success, such as well-functioning
41 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution
53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, at 102-08, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (1999) [hereinafter
Srebrenica Report] for a narrative giving an example of the application of this approach
in a particular situation, with horrible results.
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command and control systems. 2
Apart from difficulties of this sort, the mechanics of
employing the power of an international organization assumes a
willingness on the part of the states making up the organization to
pay the costs of using power. Nonetheless, neither Security
Council members nor states furnishing troops to carry out their
mandates have, since the Gulf War, shown much willingness to
undertake missions posing a significant risk of cost in lives and
resources.4 3  This risk aversion had its most unfortunate
consequences in the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the
United Nations was unable to keep its promises to protect the
inhabitants of certain "safe areas" established under its auspices.
44
Likewise, an organization cannot act if it is paralyzed by
disagreements among its members. This point is relevant since
differences between members of the Security Council regarding
the necessity and propriety of particular actions have not
disappeared with the end of the Cold War. On the contrary,
Council members continue seeking to further their perceived
national interests in the Council, rather than seeking to implement
some idea of disinterested collective action.45
In short, the Security Council has, over the past twenty-five
years, moved from a situation in which its ineffectuality was taken
for granted to one which is much more complex. On the one hand,
states now take for granted that the Council is capable of various
types of action. Nonetheless, no one can predict whether the
Security Council will act in a given situation, what type of action
it will take, and how effectively it will perform whatever tasks it
chooses to undertake. At bottom, the question comes down to
states' willingness to establish the organizational structure
necessary to support any significant undertaking in support of
peace and to bear the human and material costs of using whatever
structure they bring into being. To date, states have not, since the
Gulf War, been willing to do either.
42 See MALONE, supra note 36, at 22-23.
41 See id.
4 See Srebrenica Report, supra note 41, at 102-08.
41 See MALONE, supra note 36, at 160-69, 180-91.
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IV. Human Rights
In 1976, two multilateral international treaties dealing with
human rights were in force: the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 46 (Genocide Convention)
and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination.47 In addition, a number of European
States had entered into a regional human rights treaty, the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention).48
Since that date, a number of other international human rights
treaties have gone into force, among them the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights49 (CCPR), with its Optional
Protocol;0 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights;5' the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW);2 the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishmen 3 (CAT); and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.54 In addition, regional human rights treaties
have been established both in the Americas" and in Africa.56
46 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
47 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 [hereinafter CRD].
48 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European
Convention].
49 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter CCPR].
50 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
51 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CESC].
52 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 [hereinafter CEDAW].
53 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985)
[hereinafter CAT].
54 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448
[hereinafter CRC].
55 See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 36 O.A.S. T.S. 1,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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In addition to this proliferation of human rights treaties, there
has been a significant change in the manner in which states
collectively deal with human rights. The United Nations Human
Rights Commission has, since 1976, evolved into a body in which
a wide variety of human rights abuses are discussed openly by
representatives of governments, in fact openly rebuking known
human rights abuses. Furthermore, the members of the United
Nations have established the post of High Commissioner for
Human Rights to provide stronger direction to international efforts
to protect individuals from their governments.57 Additionally, in
1998 a number of states agreed to establish an international
criminal court with authority to try individuals for certain extreme
violations of human rights.5"
Countries acting individually have, since 1976, also changed
their approaches to human rights violations in other states.
Increasingly, they claim the right to respond to such violations.
Thus, the United States-which also became a party to the
Genocide Convention, the CCPR, and the CAT after 197659-
enacted statutes creating private rights of action for persons
tortured in foreign states and criminalizing torture and genocide
even when perpetrated by foreigners outside the United States
against other foreigners.6 Some federal courts have even
recognized civil actions under federal common law for human
rights violations,61 although the reasoning of these decisions is
doubtful.62
56 See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59.
17 See G.A. Res. 48/141, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 261, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/141 (1993).
58 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Nov. 10, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999.
59 Genocide Convention: Feb. 23, 1989, DEP'T ST. BULL., FEB., 1989, at 73.
CCPR: Sept. 8, 1992, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH at 817 (1992). CAT: Nov. 20, 1994, 6
DEP'T ST. DISPATCH at 106 (1995).
60 Private action for torture: Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256,
106 Stat. 73 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994)). Criminalization of genocide:
Genocide Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.100-606, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 3045
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (1994)). Criminalization of foreign
torture: Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 506(a), 108 Stat. 463 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340B (1994)).
61 See, e.g., Fidartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
62 See A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20
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Not only has progress been made regarding the establishment
of standards of liability and oversight institutions regarding human
rights, but there has also been progress in actually enforcing those
rights. The European regional system has for decades been quite
effective; the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
are obeyed as a matter of course by the countries that make up that
treaty system.6' The United Nations Security Council has
established tribunals to try individuals for violations of human
rights in connection with the fighting in various parts of the former
state of Yugoslavia and with the genocide that took place in
Rwanda in 1994. 64 Perhaps more fundamentally, both Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, in his report on the capture of Srebrenica by
Bosnian Serb forces in 1995, and the group of experts he
appointed to examine the reaction of the United Nations to the
genocide in Rwanda in 1994, have taken the position that the
United Nations must act against massive violations of human
rights, even if such actions require the U.N. to abandon its
tradition of neutrality between contenders.65
Nor has this opposition to human rights violations been limited
to establishing international tribunals to address such violations, or
to calls for action against violations that have not yet taken place.
NATO attacked Serbia in 1998 at least in part because the use of
force was seen as the only way to compel Serbia to cease its
violations of the rights of the ethnic Albanian province of
Kosovo. 66 Governments strongly pressured Indonesia to permit
foreign intervention in East Timor when groups opposed to that
entity's achieving independence from Indonesia began a brutal
campaign of revenge after the Timorese population, in a
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 28-48 (1995).
63 See FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
LAW, POLICY AND PROCESS 478, 487 (2d ed., 1996); BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 959 (2d ed., 1995).
64 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25626
(1993) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia);
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
(establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
65 See Srebrenica Report, supra note 41, at 106-08; Ingvar Carlsson et al., Report
of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994
Genocide in Rwanda at 26, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999).
66 See Roger Cohen, The World: Europe's New Policeman; NATO Shatters Old
Limits in the Name of Preventing Evil, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1998, § 4, at 3; Blaine
Harden, Crisis in the Balkans: Doing the Deal, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1999, § 1, at 1.
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referendum, had massively rejected continued union with
Indonesia.67 It is also noteworthy that Russia has drawn great
criticism for the harm civilians have suffered in its war against
secessionists in Chechnya.68
Individual states have also acted against human rights
violators. Great Britain asserted the authority to try the former
President of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, for acts of torture carried
out under the authority of his government.69 Similarly, Senegal
has opened a criminal inquiry against Hissene Habre, the former
president of Chad who has resided in Senegal since 1990 based on
a criminal complaint alleging Habre's responsibility for the
widespread torture perpetrated under his regime. °
It is thus clear that the attitude of the states of the world toward
human rights violations has changed considerably over the life of
the Journal. It is nonetheless important not to overstate the extent
of the changes. Although almost all states have entered into
international human rights treaties, the proportion of treaty parties
who violate their obligations under those treaties is quite high.71
Even states who have elected to permit individuals to complain to
international monitoring bodies regarding violations of human
rights treaties have a poor record of complying with the
determinations of those bodies.72  The effectiveness of the
international courts established to try persons alleged to have
violated human rights in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia
depends in great part on the willingness of states to arrest persons
the court has indicted. States have shown limited willingness to
incur the costs inherent in any effort to systematically arrest
prominent indictees, however. It is, of course, striking that both
the United Kingdom and Senegal have chosen to honor their
67 See Barbara Crossette, U.N. Chief Wants Faster Action To Avoid Slaughter in
Civil Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1999, at Al.
68 See Steven Erlanger, Rich Nations Fault Russia on Chechnya; Call for Truce,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1999, at AIO.
69 See Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and
Others Ex Parte Pinochet, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581 (1999).
70 See Joseph R. Gregory, World Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2000, at A4; Karl
Vick, Former Chad Dictator Faces Pinochet Test, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2000, at A22.
71 See A.M. Weisburd, Implications of International Relations Theory for the
International Law of Human Rights, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45, 53-57 (1999).
72 See id at 57-58.
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obligations under the Torture Convention and apply their law to
quite prominent persons implicated in massive violations of that
treaty. The very fact that such actions are unusual, however,
shows that it is by no means routine for a state to enforce
international rules against foreigners for acts done outside the
state, regardless of the legal obligations the state has purportedly
assumed. And a comparison of the events in Kosovo, East Timor,
and Chechnya hardly permits the conclusion that states have
decided that they will in all cases act to prevent massive, serious
violations of human rights. States were willing to use force
against Serbia-at least in circumstances in which casualties to
their military personnel could be avoided-but the Security
Council was unwilling to authorize the use of force in East Timor
without Indonesia's consent. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
reaction to Russian behavior in Chechnya has been purely verbal.
It would thus go too far to assert that respect for human rights
has become as well-established in international law as, for
example, respect for diplomatic immunity. But if uncertainties
remain as to states' willingness both to limit their own violations
of international human rights norms and to respond strongly to
such violations when committed by other states, it is at least clear
that the international law of human rights has ceased to be simply
a collection of platitudinous aspirations and has come to exert an
admittedly uncertain impact on the behavior of states.
V. Conclusion
How, then, can this discussion be pulled together? Certain
statements, general though they are, seem accurate. First,
international law addresses more subjects in depth than was true
twenty-five years ago. Certainly, there was law regarding
international trade, the use of force, and human rights at that time,
but the bodies of law governing each of those subjects has grown
greatly in richness of doctrine, in institutionalization, and in
effectiveness. At the same time, there has been no sea-change in
the structure of international law. It remains state-centered. For
example, although there are more international tribunals than
formerly, they remain dependent on states for the enforcement of
their rulings. Furthermore, the state-centered character of
international law means that, at this point at least, the fundamental
uncertainties of that discipline remain. More specifically, since no
rule of international law will be enforced unless some state or
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states is/are willing to bear the costs of enforcement, the
application of any such rule remains dependent primarily on
states' conclusions as to their own interests, rather than on purely
legal factors. The questions facing the international legal
community, and those who write for the Journal in the future, will
be whether states will come to assess their interests as requiring
enforcement of and obedience to legal rules more frequently than
has been true in the past, and whether such enforcement will
continue to depend on such assessments to the same extent as is
now true. Providing a forum for those seeking the answers to
these questions will surely keep the Journal as busy and as vital in
the future as it has been since its founding.

